La solution du problème en forme le plus génerale

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Nous commençons avec les Anglais, les écriteuers anonymes du journal The Economist, du 4eme de l’octobre passé:

You would expect that the world of the Quing dynasty, Tsar Nicholas I and the British East India Company would be more unequal than today’s.

Alors, on fait de comparisme entre le monde du passé, peut-être du 1820, avec le présent.

Yet in China, Thailand, Germany, and Egypt, income inequality was about the same in 2000 as it had been in 1820.

C’est d’interest, sûre; mais où se trouve le Russie et l’Inde? le tsar de russie, n’est-ce pas?

Brazil and Mexico are even more unequal than they were in the time of Simón Bolívar. Only in a few rich nations — such as France and Japan — do you find the expected long-term decline in income inequality.

What is true for individual countries is also true if you treat the world as a single nation. The study uses the Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality in which zero represents perfect equality — everyone has the same income — and 100 perfect inequality — one person has everything. The global Gini rose from 49 in 1820 to 66 in 2000. But this was not caused by widening disparities between rich and poor within countries (inequality in its usual sense).

–ah, mon pauvre cerveaux, qui comprend seulement le sens commun. …

Inequality of that sort fluctuated for 130 years to 1950, before falling sharply in 1950-1980, in what the report calls an egalitarian revolution. Since 1980 it has risen again,as Thomas Piketty, a French economist, has shown, back to the level of 1820.

That implies the two-century rise in global inequality must come from else where: from what is called ‘between-country inequality’, the gap between rich and poor nations. This gap has widened sharply. In 1820 the world’s richest country — Britain — was about 5 times richer than the average poor nation. Now America is about 25 times wealthier than the average poor country. The Gini coefficient for between-country inequality stood at only 16 in 1820 (ie, very low). It soared to 55 in 1950, and has been stable since. The driving force of inequality since 1820, in other words, has been industrialization in the West.

Alors, c’est comme mon vieux maître me disait, il y a eu deux, et seulement deux, révolutions authentiques dans l’histoire humaine: — celui de l’agriculture néolithique et celui-çi de l’industrialization britanniques du dix-huitième siècle.

This has made the global distribution of income look peculiar. A normal income distribution has a bell shape: the largest number of people are in the middle with tails of rich and poor to either side. The chart [at the head of this column — MM] shows that in 2000 global income distribution formed such a bell, as it did in 1820.

But in 1970, the line is different: a Bactrian camel not a dromedary. This reflects Western nations breaking away from the majority of the world and becoming richer (ie, moving to the right on the chart), thus creating a second hump.

The report says this development coincides with a retreat from globalization in 1914-1970. As globalization ebbed, it argues, rich countries had more freedom to steer domestic policies and used it to narrow differences between rich and poor. As globalization spread again after 1980, the opposite happened: “globalization contributed to higher income inequality within countries,” the report concludes, “while at the same time leading to a decline of income inequality between countries.”

C’est vindication, mon cher lecteur, pour l’économiste américain robert lucas mineur, duquel cette séries a déjà cité, du New York Review of Books du 13 mars 2003:

Full participation in the economic benefits of the Industrial Revolution,

Lucas writes,

is open to countries of all races and cultural backgrounds.

Fachgelehrter Robert Skidelsky a expliqué

[Lucas] believes that the enormous inequality of the postwar period is at its all-time peak, and will decline in the future until something like the more egalitarian relative incomes of 1800 are restored. Nothing but “unstable domestic politics and mercantilist trade policies” — surely a major qualification — can keep the rest of the world from “follow[ing] Japan.” And all this is an immense boon. “The legacy of economic growth that we have inherited from the Industrial Revolution is an irreversible gain to humanity, of a magnitude that is still unknown. . . . The legacy of inequality, the concomitant of this gain, is a historical transient.”

Peut-être. Peut-être l’irreversible de lundi peut se fait changer de marti. L’arrive le jour, peut-être, où le “legacy of economic growth” se passe, exactement comme, mais avec le même haute dégré de certitude comme, se passait la ‘révolution égalitaire’ des années d’après la guerre.

Retournons, mes amis lecteurs et moi, au le chart historique en haut, avec la transformation profonde indiquée par le movement de la courbe noire à la bleue et enfin à la grise d’aujourd’hui. Comment peut-on expliquer le movement, dans l’espace et temps considérables, de ces trois courbes, de cette amélioration de la condition humaine.

La Chine, qui se trouve et dans la invocation au régime antique de ces scribblers of Fleet Street et implicitement dans cette charte centrale de l’industrialization du monde; la Chine c’est le clé. Dans une revue extraordinaire (de 60 pages) de la littérature scolaire sur le question de la gestion de l’industrialization du Bretagne pendant le première moitié du dix-neuvième siècle, publiée au numéro au courant [volume 25, No. 1: mars 2014] du Journal of World History on voit les mots:

For our comparative project we need to keep in focus both the stresses and the survival of the Qing order. For our focus on the decades around 1800 we cannot do better than to begin with Kenneth Pomeranz’s essay in Armitage and Subrahmanyan, perhaps the most energetically and complexly comparative chapter in this volume. [citation omitted] He builds on and finds new dimensions of his groundbreaking account of the “great divergence” in economic trends between Western Europe [and China, words (perhaps significantly) omitted], from which all the comparative accounts of the Industrial Revolution cited below begin . . .

Enfin quelque chose indicatif.

Among the key factors of the divergence around 1800 in his [K. Pomeranz’s] account was Britain’s easy access to coal within its own island and to timber from North America.

Pour qu’on savait en précis la thème du son The Great Divergence. China, Europe and the Making of the Modern world Economy [Princeton University Press: 2000], les éditeurs donnent notice sur couperture en dos du livre:

Winner of the 2000 John K. Fairbanks Prize [il est fameux professeur de l’histoire de Chine au Harvard]

Cowinner of the 2001 World History Association Book Prize

The Great Divergence brings new insight to one of the classic questions of history: Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe [that’s code for Holland and England — MM], despite surprising similarities between advanced areas of Europe and East Asia?

Kenneth Pomeranz shows, as recently as 1750, parallels between these two parts of the world in life expectancy, consumption, product and factor markets [that is, markets in finished goods and in commodities], the strategies of households, and perhaps most surprisingly, ecology.

Pomeranz argues that Europe’s 19th-century divergence from the Old World owes much to the fortunate location of coal, which substituted for timber, and trade with the Americas; together, coal and the New World allowed Europe to grow along resource-intensive labor-saving paths.

C’est la rescucitation du thèse de C.L.R. James, que l’esclavage donnait au mains mercantiles de l’Angleterre les ressouces de capital à développer l’industrie. Mais dans cette forme nous parlaieons de l’économie plantacionnaire de l’Atlantique du Nord. L’Irlande, le Caribe est inclus, avec les fermes des carolines, dans le processus extensive d’extraction des ressources naturels pour que dériver le progrès éventuel industrielle anglais.

La revolution industrielle c’est fondée sur l’esclavage des noirs. C’est le result des recherches du denier cri du communauté des savants historiens.

About M. Meo

Worked as translator, museum technician, truck lumper, lecture demonstrator, teacher (of English as a Second Language, science, math). Married for 25 years, 2 boys aged 18 & 16 (both on the Grant cross-country team). A couple of scholarly publications in the history of science. Two years in federal penitentiary, 1970/71, for refusing the draft.
This entry was posted in Economics, Education, Empire, Global, Inequality, Local government, Marxism, Pacific Green Party, Permaculture, Spiritual life, Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

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